This paper explores the relationship between the economic turmoil generated by the Great Recession and the increase of secessionism in different regions of Western countries. Some authors have stressed that the Great Recession triggered profound changes in political attitudes and preferences and, in the context of a conflict between the centre and the periphery, fuelled secessionism as a radical shift of the institutional setup. Nevertheless, other researchers have remarked that a deep recession may make voters more accommodating with the status quo and more reluctant to take radical stances. Our paper aims at contributing to this debate by analyzing the case of Catalonia. We use the variation of economic variables and data from surveys and electoral outcomes at the level of municipalities to explore the relationship between the deterioration of the economic situation (that is, the local variation in the intensity of the crisis) and the increase of preferences for secession among the Catalan population. The findings from the analysis of our empirical models do not support the hypothesis that the heterogeneous effects of the Great Recession had any significant impact on political preferences at the level of municipality in Catalonia. These findings contribute to our understanding of the effects of hard economic times on people's attitudes and behaviour.
Introduction
A common view among commentators and electoral pundits is that economic crises are strong determinants of decentralization demands or support for secession.
Economic downturns-the argument goes-bring about popular discontent, polarize political positions and trigger centrifugal forces that fan the desire for autonomy or outright independence. Many examples of this can be found in the press, especially referred to the effects of the Great Recession in a number of European regions. One can come across sentences like "To many observers, the disintegration forces that characterize Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders are just the by-products of Europe's economic despair" (World Economic Forum, August 2014) 1 or "There is nothing like unemployment and austerity to fuel the fires of secession" (The Nation, April 2014) 2 ,
which represent a small sample of this widespread opinion.
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Despite the ubiquity of this line of reasoning, there is little research providing empirical evidence that economic bad times lead to an increase in support for secession (or even decentralization). While the grievances exacerbated by economic recessions might indeed boost secessionist support, a theoretical argument can also be made in the other way round, namely, that economic crises lead citizens to accept the status quo, as individuals deem secession as too risky and costly when economic times turn turbulent.
We aim at contributing to this debate by analyzing the relationship between the effects of the Great Recession and the increase in the support to secessionist demands in Catalonia. At least since 2010 there has been a remarkable upsurge in the support to the creation of a new Catalan independent state among the population of Catalonia (today a region of Spain). This increase, however, varies substantially across the Catalan geography. Moreover, the Great Recession had a heterogeneous impact across the Catalan territory, affecting some places more than others. We exploit this variability to examine the effect of the economic crisis on the increase (or decrease) in support for independence. To capture the intensity of the recession we use several economic indicators. Although some authors (see for instance Boylan, 2015 and Rico and Liñeira, 2014) have mentioned that the economic crisis could be an important factor to explain the increase of secessionism in Catalonia, there is very little academic research aiming at evaluating the validity of the hypothesis.
The situation in Catalonia during the period 2010-2015 makes it a clear case for our purposes. First, the economic shock of the Great Recession and its aftermath had dramatic effects in Catalonia after 2009. Many of the worst consequences of the Great Recession were felt in the labour market, but almost all economic sectors were severely affected. In addition, the economic policies put in place to fight against some of the problems created much popular discontent. Spain experienced an unpopular combination of fiscal austerity and public bailouts of substantial parts of the financial system, caused respectively by the debt and the banking crises. These additional ingredients in the economic policy recipe further contributed to social discontent and political disaffection. Second, data coming from different surveys indicate that support for independence in Catalonia grew from 15% to 50% between 2006 and 2014 and, additionally, electoral outcomes and trends in popular mobilization also point to the same direction. 4 See sections 3 and 4 for more details on the political situation in Catalonia and the opinion surveys.
5 Additionally one could argue that the relationship between bad economic times and support for independence was not observed back in 1993, when economic growth in Catalonia was negative (-1.1 per cent) and the unemployment rate reached values higher than 20 per cent. Then preferences for secession remained stable throughout the period.
Figure 1: Evolution of unemployment in Catalonia and support for independence (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) Note: Unemployment data comes from Eurostat. Data for support for secession comes from the CEO surveys (see section 4 and Appendix).
All in all, did the intensity of the economic crisis lead to an increase in support for independence? Our research plan is to take advantage of the variation of economic variables (real income, employment, unemployment, and number of firms) and data from surveys and electoral outcomes at the level of municipalities in Catalonia in order to explore whether there is any relationship between the surge of secessionism and the main economic effects of the Great Recession. Thus, our empirical models capture the quantitative effects of the economic consequences of the Great Recession on the recent growth of support for independence in the political preferences of the Catalan citizenry. In this particular sense, this article also relates to a body of recent research on the political reactions triggered by the Great Recession (see, for instance, Hernandez and Kriesi, 2016) .
Despite the popularity of the argument amongst many political commentators, our findings do not support the hypothesis that there is a relationship between the negative economic consequences of the Great Recession and the increase in 
Support for independence Unemployment
Unemployment Support for secession support for independence among the citizens of Catalonia. Higher levels of destruction of jobs, disappearance of firms, or reduction of income in different municipalities do not appear to lead to higher increases in secessionist support.
Results are robust across the different dimensions of the economic crisis and the different model specifications. In this sense, our research suggests that the prosecession tide in Catalonia might not recede when the economy gets better, unless there are also further changes in the political situation in Spain.
Theory
The literature offers three main explanations to understand why some individuals support the creation of a new State, while others are opposed to it. A first strand of research has analyzed the relationship between support for secession and attitudes or partisan preferences. This includes, for instance, the study of the connection between backing for independence and attitudes towards the European Union (Dardanelli, 2005) or how the probability of supporting secession varies when individuals consider different alternative institutional arrangements (Serrano, 2013a) .
As for parties, previous works have mainly analyzed how party strategies shape citizens' preferences for secession (Richez and Bodet, 2012; Willems, 2014) .
A second group of scholars have looked at the role of regional identity/ies and its relationship with pro-secessionist predisposition (Serrano, 2013b) . The point of departure is that the regional versus "statist" dimension is the main factor driving individual's support for secession (Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Paasi, 2009, Guinjoan and Rodon, 2016a) . Finally, and most importantly for this article, secession has also been associated with the economic dimension.
The link between support for independence and economic factors has been traditionally conceptualized in three interrelated ways. Firstly, high levels of support for independence have been considered to be associated with individual economic deprivation. For instance, Rico and Liñeira argue that "the rise of Catalan secessionism may thus be a particularised manifestation of the growing political dissatisfaction that was ultimately produced by the economic crisis […] the proindependence tide will therefore probably recede as the economy recovers" (2014: 273) . In Scotland, previous research (McKendrick et al, 2014) has shown that the increase in secessionist secondment is partly due to the harsh austerity measures implemented in the region during the eighties. Overall, according to this reasoning, people suffering the effects of the economic crisis cease to trust the central institutions and, as a result, they start considering breaking up the status quo and embrace the necessity to create a new State. This line of argument is connected with research that has documented a positive link between economic vulnerability and hostility toward immigrants or high support for populist parties, especially when analyzing the effects of economic downturns (Hernández and Kriesi, 2016) . For this reason, secessionism in Catalonia and other European regions has often been considered a populist movement and regarded as a by-product of the harshness of the economic effects of the Great Recession.
Secondly, and related to the first point of view, increasing support for independence has been shown to be linked to positive expectations about the future of the region's economy. Although these expectations also have a role to play during good economic times, it is likely that they are regarded as more important during economic downturns. The basic tenet of this line of reasoning is that pro-secessionist individuals tend to think that the economy (and, as a result, their economic status) would be better-off if the region was able to create its own State (Blais, 1992; Clarke et al, 2004; Howe, 1998; Boylan, 2015) . In other words, people will opt for an independent state if they perceive it can serve to achieve their economic goals.
Thirdly, a bad economy, and the austerity measures associated to it, has been shown to increase political recentralization measures (Bolgherini, 2014) . If this is the case, the reversal of decentralization can polarize the centre-periphery cleavage and provide an argument for regionalist parties that accommodation is not possible and that contestation is the only way forward (Muro and Vlaskamp, 2016) . Although the effect of the economy would be in this case indirect, it might be that the interaction between a shock in people's economic situation and recentralization measures can further exacerbate secessionist concerns. Or, in other words, since recentralization affects everyone in the region, its effects on secessionist demands should be higher in places where the economic shock has been more severe.
Despite the popularity of these arguments, the academic evidence that validates them is mixed. For instance, at the aggregate level, Sorens (2005) found that the economic opportunities brought about by globalization are positively related to secessionist vote growth. Serrano (2013a) showed that those wanting a high degree of fiscal autonomy for the Catalan region are significantly more likely to support independence. Muñoz and Tormos (2015) portrayed a different picture. Using a survey experiment, they showed that that economic considerations play an independent role on support for secession, but only for citizens with ambivalent identity positions and for those who have no party identification, or are supporters of parties with less clear-cut stances on the issue. Similarly, and using data for Catalonia, Guinjoan and Rodon (2016b) show that, although support for independence grew for all socio-economic groups during the period 2008-2014, this growth was larger (smaller) for employed (unemployed) individuals and middle and high (low) income groups. Furthermore, the empirical evidence provided by Boylan (2015) seems to show that the increase of independence aspirations "do not seem to materialize from poor outlooks on the region's economic performance or employment status", which goes against the idea that the Great Recession and higher unemployment rates are the main culprits of the surge of secessionism in Catalonia.
Summing up, the empirical evidence on the relationship between the effect of economic crisis and secessionist demands is far from being compelling. On top of this, one could argue that the theoretical case for it is not conclusive either. Thus, while most previous works emphasize the existence of a relationship between economic crisis and secessionist demands, they do not contemplate that a theoretical connection can also be made between economic crises and the acceptance of the status quo. A rich tradition of psychological research, going back to Fromm (2001 Fromm ( [1941 ), argues that insecurity and uncertainty, as plausible byproducts of job or income losses, are associated with adopting conservative stances and acceptance of the status quo. In other words, economic instability makes people more willing to submit to authority and accept the current state of events. Indeed, previous evidence has failed to show that crisis induce political reforms (Drazen and Easterly, 2001, Galasso, 2014) . If this argument holds, we should expect secessionist support to be stable (or even diminish) during bad economic times.
Under economic recessions, people face uncertainty and may consider that the cost of secession is too high to bear (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991 and Volpato et al, 2017) . Previous research on Quebec confirms this logic by showing that attitude toward risk-taking was a contributing factor in the outcome of the 1995 referendum (Nadeau et al. 1999 ).
All in all, the jury is still out on whether economic crises increase support for independence. This link is precisely what we aim at studying using the case of the Great Recession in Catalonia. per cent of voters to the 'No' and 11.5 per cent to other options whose proponents explicitly refused their being added to any of the two main contenders, both the proindependence and pro-union camps claimed victory, arguing respectively that the 'Yes' (47.8) and the non-'Yes' (50.6) had prevailed.
Catalonia
7 The total population of Catalonia at the time was slightly above 7.5 million.
Economic landscape
The years before the Great Recession were characterized as a period of remarkable 
Data

Dependent variable
This article exploits the heterogeneous impact of the Great Recession on different municipalities and analyzes whether this economic shock is related with variations in secessionist support. In order to test this, we first need to measure the difference in the support for independence before and after the economic crisis. This task faces two main challenges. First, compared to Scotland or Quebec, where secessionist preferences were directly revealed after an official referendum took place, Catalans
have not yet voted in an official consultation and, therefore, data on the support for secession mainly comes from surveys, measuring citizens' attitudes rather than actual behavior. Second, support for secession is traditionally measured at the regional level and data at lower levels of geographical aggregation is scarce or does not exist.
Considering these challenges, we measure support for secession in three different ways.
8 First, we estimate it by combining surveys and official election results.
Second, we capture it using georeferenced surveys at the municipality level. Finally, to complement our arguments, we also turn to surveys to measure individuals' support for independence. first, considering only electoral support for all parties and, second, adding abstainers.
The first indicator estimates the percentage of secessionist supporters among voters while the second takes into account the whole electoral census. As explained before, we used the figures in Table 1 11 While the increase in secessionist support is remarkable, there is also substantial variation across municipalities (see also Figure A in the Appendix).
11 Since both estimations provide similar results, from this point onwards we will focus on the latter. Unfortunately, not all Catalan municipalities were (randomly) included in them and, for some cases, the number of respondents was very low. While the first concern should be alleviated by the design of the survey (CEO performs stratified random samples with territorial quotas), the second may bias our results by including municipalities in which the variation is not correctly estimated. In order to deal with this problem, we select only municipalities in which the number of interviewed individuals was higher than 15 (n=228).
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Our third and final variable measures support for secession at the individual level.
Using the CEO surveys, we create a dummy variable that identifies whether an individual supports secession (1) or not (0). The main explanatory variable is also a dummy identifying whether an individual is unemployed (1) versus the rest (0). We do this for each year between 2006 and 2015.
Independent variables
There are several economic variables which potentially reflect the negative impact of the Great Recession in Catalonia and are available on at least a yearly basis at the level of municipality. These are related to unemployment, employment, number of firms and gross disposable household income. The first three are available for all municipalities (946 observations) and the fourth is only available for all municipalities bigger than 5,000 inhabitants plus a few others (211 observations).
Unemployment
The data on unemployment available at municipality level is "registered unemployment", that is, the number of workers who are registered as unemployed in the public job service offices of the regional government. This data is accessible for the whole period [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] 14 during which the number of registered unemployed workers more than doubled and rose above half million in 2015.
Employment
13 If we move up or down the 15 cases threshold results are still robust.
14 The figures for aggregate unemployment rates in section 3 correspond to "estimated unemployment" (that is, number of unemployed workers based on the Labour Force Survey). This is not available at the level of municipalities.
The number of affiliated workers to the Social Security residing in the municipality is taken as the measure to approximate employment. The data is available since 2008.
More than 9 per cent of total employment disappeared during the period 2008-2015.
There is another measure of employment which is the number of affiliated workers to the Social Security based on the location of the corresponding contribution account (which normally matches the establishment where the worker is employed). The obvious disadvantage of this measure is that many employees counted in one location this way might not reside (and, hence, vote) in the same place. The main advantages are that in this case the data is available for the whole period [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] and that there is information about additional characteristics of workers, in particular, the economic sector and size of the company where they work.
Number of firms
The number of firms in each municipality is approximated by the number of contribution accounts to the Social Security. Firms may use a single contribution account for all their workers in a province or have a different contribution account for each establishment they have in the province. This means that the figure is only an approximation of the number of firms in each municipality because some firms might have an establishment in one location and no contribution account there if its workers are associated to a contribution account of the same firm in a different location. Despite this drawback, the information on contribution accounts is the best available data to approximate the number of firms situated in a given municipality.
This data is accessible for the whole period 2006-2015, during which the total number of firms decreased by more than 12 per cent.
The data on employed and unemployed workers and quotation centers is available quarterly. In order to compute the difference between 2006 (or 2008) and 2015, we choose the value corresponding to the third quarter (September) because the regional elections took place in this month and also to avoid seasonality problems.
Gross Disposable Household Income
The Statistical Office in Catalonia (Idescat) publishes an estimation of the Gross Disposable Household Income for all municipalities larger than 5,000 inhabitants plus all the county ("comarca") capitals. This data is only available for the period 2008-2013, during which per capita income decreased by 4.3 per cent in Catalonia.
Control variables
Finally, our empirical models also control for some important factors at the municipality level that can affect the relationship between economic indicators and support for secession. The first key control is the percentage of population born outside Catalonia. As previous literature has consistently shown (Serrano, 2013; Rodon, 2015) , this variable captures an important part of the variation in secessionist support. The second control is the percentage of population who are 65 years and older. Support for secession is negatively related to age (Muñoz and Tormos, 2014) and, therefore, it is plausible to think that support for secession grew less in municipalities where the percentage of elderly population is higher. The third control, population density, aims at tackling the urban-rural divide. According to previous works (Rodon, 2015) , support for secession is higher in less dense rural regions than in the urban parts. The fourth indicator controls for whether the mayor after the 2011 local election belonged to a pro-sovereign party (CiU, ERC or CUP) or otherwise.
Secessionist opponents have repeatedly accused pro-independence parties to use the institutions to promote secessionism. If this were true, it would be advisable to control for a (supposedly) higher increase in secessionist support in places where pro-sovereign parties govern and a lower increase in places where they do not. Conversely, in some municipalities support for secession in 2006 was low and, therefore, the statistical increase in support for secession was much more likely.
Our empirical strategy is based on conventional OLS regressions. In addition, models include region fixed-effects, which effectively mean that we are comparing growth rate variation in municipalities within a specific region.
16 Table 2 summarizes our variable of interest, the main independent variables and the control variables. Table A in the Appendix provide the sources of all variables. 
Results
This section contains the main empirical results. Models M1 to M5 in Table 3 The dependent variable is the growth rate of estimated support for independence at the municipality level between 2006 and 2015. The strategy to compute it relies on a combination between surveys and electoral data (see details in the Data section).
As explained in section 4, to check for the robustness of our results we employ an alternative version of the variable that measures secessionist support at the municipality level. Using georeferenced surveys, we were able to calculate the percentage of people supporting "An Independent State" both in 2006 and 2015. As before, we also calculated the growth rate between these percentages. Although we lose a fair amount of observations, this measure can be interpreted as a more direct indicator of support for secession. In addition, the 229 municipalities for which we have information in the surveys represent most of the Catalan territory and population (observations are fairly balanced across space).
Descriptive data shows that the growth of support to independence varies substantially across municipalities. In almost all of them the growth rate is positive.
However, while in some places the growth rate is modest (in 25 per cent of the municipalities independence support grows by less than 70 per cent), in others the increase is significant (in 25 per cent of the municipalities the growth rate is higher than 277 per cent).
When we employ this alternative measurement, results are consistent with what we found in Table 3 . As displayed in Table 4 , none of the economic indicators, which contemplate different dimensions of the effect of the Great Recession, is significant. Second, we employed additional economic indicators that, while being less accurate, reflect relevant dimensions of the Great Recession. In particular, since the construction industry was severely affected by the economic consequences of the crisis, it seems appropriate to look at the growth rate of buildings initiated and finished and the growth rate of the quotation centres in the construction industry. In both cases the results are exactly the same. In addition, when we include other controls in the models, such as the percentage of citizens who speak Catalan, the percentage of foreigners residing in the location or party polarization at the municipality level (measured as the difference between the percentages of votes received by pro-and anti-sovereignty parties), results also remain unaffected.
Finally, we ran different model specifications to check for further robustness of our findings. When we run different models, such as a censored regression model or a geographically weighted regression, results are also consistent.
Conclusions
There is little doubt that the impact of the Great Recession in many Western countries has transcended the realm of the economy and has had important consequences in many other social dimensions. In particular, there is a growing body of literature that studies the political reactions it has triggered in different countries. The impact of the Great Recession on the upsurge of secessionism in different European regions has often been mentioned in the press and political commentary and, yet, has been almost absent of this line of research. This paper contributes to filling this hole in the literature by analyzing the Catalan case, which is nowadays, together with Scotland, the most pressing example in the world of a strong secessionist movement in a liberal democracy.
The existence of a relationship between the economic turmoil generated by the Great Recession and the increase of secessionism is not completely obvious from a theoretical point of view. On the one hand, many authors have stressed that the Great Recession triggered profound changes in political attitudes and preferences fueling voters' discontent with the political system and, in the context of a conflict between the centre and the periphery, favoring secessionism as a radical shift of the institutional setup. On the other hand, a deep economic recession may make voters more accommodating with the status quo and more reluctant to take radical stances which might be regarded as too risky in a context of economic insecurity. Our paper intends to evaluate empirically this hypothesis and in this sense represents a welcome contribution to this strand of literature.
The fact that there are very few cases of strong secessionist movements in the Western world makes it difficult to use cross-sectional international data to implement a meaningful empirical test of the hypothesis. In our paper, we take a different approach and use the variation of economic variables and data from surveys and electoral outcomes at the level of municipalities in Catalonia to explore whether there is any relationship between the surge of secessionism and the main economic effects of the Great Recession.
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The results of our empirical models indicate that there is not any relationship between economic variables and support for secession at the level of municipalities.
Neither of the different dimensions of the economic crisis that we operationalize (unemployment, firms' closures, income loss…) has a statistically significant effect on the variation of secessionist support. Moreover, this outcome is robust to the different specifications we tried and is compatible with additional results obtained using survey data at individual level.
These findings open some avenues for further research: First, future works will need to dig into how people's expectations shape their secessionist preferences. Our findings, together with previous experimental evidence (Muñoz and Tormos, 2014) , show that the "objective" state of the economy does not seem to cause an effect on people's preferences for secession. If there is any such effect, this might run through people's expectations or a long-term process difficult to capture with existing data.
Second, all of the existing evidence aimed at explaining secessionist support point to a significant and greater effect of other covariates, such as identity and the role of partisan heuristics. Future research may design causal identification strategies to identify the effect of some of these factors, as well as the moderating role of the economy.
Finally, our research sheds some light on the current debate between those who think that the pro-secession tide in Catalonia is a by-product of the Great Recession and might recede as the economy gets better and those who argue that it is a symptom of a deeper political conflict and, as such, will probably stay the same unless there are political big changes in Spain. 1 ("Less than 1000 euros") to 6 ("More than 5000 euros") Age Vegueria 7 different regions Table A. Standard errors in parentheses + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: All models are logistic regressions with support for secession (1 favorable; 0 against) as the outcome. The main explanatory variable is "unemployed", a dummy that distinguishes whether the respondent was unemployed (1) or not (0). The other control variables are operationalized as follows: age (continuous variable), national subjective identification (from 1 "I feel only Spanish" to 5 "I feel only Catalan"), Ideology (1 "Extreme left" to 10 "Extreme right"), Gender (1 "Men", 0 "Women"), and Income (1 "monthly household income equals less than 1000 euros" to 6 "monthly household income is higher than 6500 euros"). These models have been employed to calculate the marginal effects illustrated in Figure 7 . 
